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vice subject to the PUC's jurisdiction with

i rates, terms or conditions differing from
the schedules on file with the PUC, except
under specified conditions. This bill would
also provide that a local agency is exempt
from any requirement to make available
for public inspection a contract negotiated
by the local agency for the provision of
gas, but may disclose the contract information under specified conditions. The
provisions of the bill would be repealed
January 1, 2001. [S. Inactive File]
SB 25 (Leonard, Peace), as amended
July 15, is an urgency bill which would
prohibit the PUC from requiring utilities
to purchase specific "resource additions"
from alternative independent power producers; this bill would abolish the Biennial Resource Plan Update procedure implemented by the PUC through which alternative energy producers bid for the right
to sell their energy to utilities at a PUC-determined price. [15:1 CRLR 166-67] [A.
U&C]
0

LITIGATION

On December 18 in Assembly of the
State of California v. PUC (Pacific Telesis, Real Party in Interest), 12 Cal. 4th 87,
the California Supreme Court annulled the
PUC's 1994 disposition of approximately
$50 million assessed against Pacific Bell
for research and development costs for
wireless and cellular systems financed
through phone rates between 1974 and
1983.
In its 1994 ruling, the PUC decided that
when PacBell spun off Pacific Telesis's
wireless operations into the extensive cellular enterprise "Airtouch," it took with it
into the competitive market sector $7.9
million in research and development costs
derived from ratepayer contribution; accordingly, in order to repay the ratepayers
and preclude the unjust enrichment of the
spin-off for-profit enterprise, the PUC ordered Pacific Telesis to pay $7.9 million
plus 18% interest (a total of $42.1 million
in interest) into a designated account. The
Commission ordered that the $7.9 million
in "refund principal" be allocated to PacBell ratepayers through a surcredit on
monthly bills. It further allocated $40 million in interest to be used for telecommunications programs and facilities in public
schools statewide; and allocated $2.1 million in interest to continue its Telecommunications Education Trust. [14:4 CRLR
201-02] Petitioners challenged the Commission's action, contending that the PUC
violated Public Utilities Code section 453.5
by failing to order a refund of the entire
amount of the Pacific Telesis refund account to PacBell customers; the petitioners further contended that in diverting a

portion of the funds for a different, public
use of its own choosing, the PUC improperly invaded the legislative domain of
taxation and appropriation.
The California Supreme Court explained that Pacific Telesis was obligated
to refund money to ratepayers pursuant to
a 1982 FCC order; the amount of the refund ordered by the PUC was calculated
based upon the refund principal ($7.9 million) plus interest on the principal. The
court explained that as an alternative to
charging the high interest rate of 18% on
the refund principal, the PUC could have
sought to impose a penalty against Pacific
Telesis or PacBell-separate from the rate
refund-because of their disregard of the
FCC order; however, the PUC chose not
to proceed in that fashion, and elected to
obtain interest on the refund principal.
The court then found that because the
funds were deposited by Pacific Telesis
pursuant to its existing obligation to distribute a rate refund to PacBell's customers, the disbursement of the funds by the
PUC is governed by section 453.5, which
provides-among other things-that whenever the PUC orders rate refunds to be
distributed, the Commission shall require
public utilities to pay refunds to all current
utility customers and, when practicable, to
prior customers on an equitable pro rata
basis. According to the court, the legislative history on section 453.5 indicates that
a purpose of the enactment was to restrict
the PUC's discretion with respect to the
use of ratepayer refunds ordered by it.
Further, the court explained that nothing in section 453.5 suggests that, once
having ordered the distribution of a rate
refund to a utility's current customers, the
PUC may refuse to refund to those customers the interest that the PUC has assessed against the utility on the basis of the
refund principal; according to the court,
"[tihe interest charged on the ratepayer
refund constitutes part of the refund" and
must be refunded to ratepayers pursuant to
section 453.5.
In San Diego Gas & Electric v. SuperiorCourt (Covalt), 36 Cal. App. 4th 1461
(1995), the Fourth District Court of Appeal dismissed Martin and Joyce Covalt's
suit against an electric utility for damages
from electromagnetic field (EMF) emissions caused by power lines near their
home. The court reasoned that the PUC
has exclusive jurisdiction over this matter,
which precludes a suit for damages. On
April 7, the Covalts filed a petition for
review to the California Supreme Court; on
May 11, the high court granted it. [15:2&3
CRLR 208]
On September 25, the American Medical Association and the California Medi-
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cal Association filed a brief stating that no
scientifically documented health risk has
been associated with the usually occurring
levels of electromagnetic fields. In a separately filed brief, 14 scientists who have
studied the effects of EMF, including six
Nobel laureates, state that the current concern over EMF health hazards is not supported by the weight of credible scientific
evidence.
The high court is expected to make a
decision before the end of 1996.
In Southern California Gas Company
v. City of Vernon, 41 Cal. App. 4th 209
(Dec. 20, 1995), the Second District Court
of Appeal ruled that the design and construction of a Southern California Gas Company (SoCalGas) pipeline under the City
ofVernon is within the regulatory purview
of the PUC, not the city.
SoCalGas holds a franchise to lay and
use pipes beneath Vernon's streets. In May
1992, SoCalGas submitted two alternate
routes for a gas pipeline under the city. In
June 1992, Vernon informed the gas company that its applications failed to satisfy
City safety requirements. After losing an
appeal to the city council, SoCalGas filed
a petition for a writ of mandate in superior
court. The trial court granted the SoCalGas'
petition and, on May 25, 1993, directed
the city to approve the pipeline permit. On
appeal, the Second District affirmed the
trial court's ruling because the regulation
of pipeline safety is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the PUC, and Vernon did
not object to the pipeline on the limited
ground available to it under the franchise
it granted to SoCalGas.
*

FUTURE MEETINGS
The full Commission usually meets
every other Wednesday in San Francisco.

STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA
President: James E. Towery
Executive Officer:
Herbert Rosenthal
(415) 561-8200 and
(213) 765-1000
TDD for Hearing- and SpeechImpaired:
(415) 561-8231 and
(213) 765-1566
Toll-Free Complaint Hotline:
1-800-843-9053

T

he State Bar of California was created
by legislative act in 1927 and codified
in the California Constitution at Article
VI, section 9. The State Bar was estab24
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lished as a public corporation within the
judicial branch of government, and membership is a requirement for all attorneys
practicing law in California. Today, the
State Bar has over 145,000 members, which
equals approximately 17% of the nation's
population of lawyers.
The State Bar Act, Business and Professions Code section 6000 et seq., designates a Board of Governors to run the State
Bar. The Board President is elected by the
Board of Governors at its June meeting
and serves a one-year term beginning in
September. Only governors who have
served on the Board for three years are
eligible to run for President.
The Board consists of 23 membersseventeen licensed attorneys and six nonlawyer public members. Of the attorneys,
sixteen of them-including the President-are elected to the Board by lawyers
in nine geographic districts. A representative of the California Young Lawyers Association (CYLA), appointed by that
organization's Board of Directors, also
sits on the Board. The six public members
are variously selected by the Governor,
Assembly Speaker, and Senate Rules
Committee, and confirmed by the state
Senate. Each Board member serves a
three-year term, except for the CYLA representative (who serves for one year) and
the Board President (who serves a fourth
year when elected to the presidency). The
terms are staggered to provide for the selection of five attorneys and two public
members each year.
The State Bar includes twenty standing
committees; fourteen special committees,
addressing specific issues; sixteen sections covering fourteen substantive areas
of law; Bar service programs; and the
Conference of Delegates, which gives a
representative voice to 245 local, ethnic,
and specialty bar associations statewide.
The State Bar and its subdivisions perform a myriad of functions which fall into
six major categories: (1) testing State Bar
applicants and accrediting law schools;
(2) enforcing the State Bar Act and the
Bar's Rules of Professional Conduct,
which are codified at section 6076 of the
Business and Professions Code, and promoting competence-based education; (3)
ensuring the delivery of and access to legal
services; (4) educating the public; (5) improving the administration of justice; and
(6) providing member services.
Almost 75% of the Bar's annual $56
million budget is spent on its attorney
discipline system. The system includes the
first full-time professional court for attorney discipline in the nation and a large
staff of investigators and prosecutors. The
Bar recommends sanctions to the CaliforC46

nia Supreme Court, which makes final
discipline decisions. However, Business
and Professions Code section 6007 authorizes the Bar to place attorneys on involuntary inactive status if they pose a substantial threat of harm to clients or to the
public, among other reasons.
At its July meeting, the Board of Govemors elected James E. Towery to succeed
Donald Fischbach as State Bar President.
Towery defeated candidate Dorothy
Tucker from Los Angeles, who sought to
be the first non-lawyer president in the
Bar's history. Towery is a partner in the
San Jose firm of Hoge, Fenton, Jones &
Appel and chairs the board of directors of
the Alexian Brothers Hospital in San Jose.
He served as president of the Santa Clara
Bar Association in 1989. Towery began
his one-year term as president at the Bar's
annual meeting on September 28-October
I in San Francisco.
Also at the annual meeting, six new
lawyer members joined the Board of Governors. District 2 elected Samuel L. Jackson, the Sacramento City Attorney. District 3 elected Ann M. Ravel, a chief assistant county counsel in Santa Clara. District 4 elected Raymond C. Marshall, a
partner in the firm of McCutchen, Doyle,
Brown & Enersen, who served as president of the Bar Association of San Francisco last year. Jeffrey A. Tidus, a principal in the Los Angeles firm of Horn, Tidus
& Loomis, and Leon Goldin, a sole practitioner, were elected to fill two open spots
in District 7. The California Young Lawyers Association elected Constantine
Buzunis, from the San Diego firm of Neil,
Dymott, Perkins, Brown & Frank. Each of
the new governors will serve three-year
terms, except the CYLA member who
serves for one year.

U

MAJOR PROJECTS

State Bar Court Judges Ousted. In
July, State Bar Court (SBC) Presiding
Judge Lise Pearlman and incumbent hearing judges Jennifer Gee, Alan Goldhammer, Ellen Peck, and JoAnne Robbins
were effectively given pink slips when the
seven-member Applicant Evaluation and
Nomination Committee appointed by the
California Supreme Court failed to nominate them for second terms in the positions
they have held for the past six years.
When the SBC was created by SB 1498
(Presley) (Chapter 1159, Statutes of 1988),
its members were appointed by the Supreme Court for six-year terms, upon nomination by the Board of Governors. The
statute also provided that, "unless otherwise directed by the Supreme Court," the
Board of Governors would also screen,
rate, and nominate all candidates for reap-

pointment to the Court. Because the Board
administratively controls the investigation
and prosecution of cases, critics argued
that it was in a position to exert special
influence over SBC judges by potentially
not recommending them for reappointment
-thus compromising the court's independence.
After a lengthy internal skirmish between the SBC and the Board of Governors over the procedures governing the
reappointment process, the California Supreme Court rejected both sides' proposals and adopted its own procedure in December 1994. The Court amended Rule of
Court 961 to provide for its appointment
of a seven-member Applicant Evaluation
and Nomination Committee, consisting of
four lawyers, two active or retired judges,
and one public member. The amended rule
requires that no more than two members
of the Committee may be current members
of the Board of Governors, neither of whom
may sit on the Board's Discipline Committee, which directly oversees the Office
of the Chief Trial Counsel. The Committee must evaluate the qualifications of all
applicants for appointment and reappointment to the State Bar Court, and make
recommendations to the Supreme Court;
the Committee must submit the names of
at least three qualified applicants for each
vacancy. Additionally, the Committee must
notify any incumbent seeking reappointment if he or she is not among the candidates recommended for reappointment to
a new term at the time it submits its recommendations. [15:1 CRLR 174-75]
Although the Supreme Court's revision of the rule was close to the suggestion
of Presiding Judge Pearlman, outside critics feared that the appointed committee
members might be influenced by current
Bar staff and might seek to retaliate against
incumbent SBC judges. This fear was exacerbated by an ongoing effort by the State
Bar to control the detailed administration
of the court. [15:2&3 CRLR 212] However, that possibility seemed unlikely given
the noted success of the SBC, including
lavish praise from the Discipline Evaluation Committee which recently undertook
a comprehensive evaluation of the Bar's
disciplinary system. Specifically, the report recognized the fact that the Supreme
Court had granted almost no writs of review since the SBC was created, which
may be interpreted as a vote of confidence
from the state's highest court. [14:4 CRLR
209-10]
However unlikely that contingency
seemed, the Applicant Evaluation and Nomination Committee's recommendations did
not include the aforementioned names of
incumbent SBCjudges seeking reappoint-
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ment. Although the judges were given no
reason as to why they were not recommended for reappointment, the justification for nonrenewal was characterized in
the legal press as "excessive leniency" by
the court. However, only one of the Review Department judges (Presiding Judge
Pearlman) was not recommended for renewal, and its decisions have been consistently unanimous.
In a July 17 letter to the Supreme
Court, former State Bar Discipline Monitor Robert C. Feilmeth of the Center for
Public Interest Law urged the Court not to
adopt the recommendations of its screening committee. He argued that the nonrenewal is the latest attempt by the Bar to
deter the SBC from realizing "necessary
independence." He cautioned that "without sufficient separation from the prosecution and from the practicing profession,"
the SBC cannot warrant the reliance of
either the Supreme Court or the public.
Despite the pleas of Fellmeth and other
critics, in August the Supreme Court
adopted the recommendations of its committee and announced the new members
of the State Bar Court. The new presiding
judge will be James Obrien, 68, of Costa
Mesa. Obrien was a member of the Board
of Governors from 1987 to 1990, and
served as Bar Vice-President in 1989-90.
He will join two incumbents, Ronald
Stovitz of San Francisco (who was reappointed for a full six-year term) and H.
Kenneth Norian of Los Angeles, the public member of the Review Panel (who was
reappointed for a three-year term to create
a staggered appointment schedule).
At the Hearing Department level, the
new SBC judges include former Los Angeles Deputy District Attorney Michael
Marcus (appointed to a six-year term);
Oakland attorney Nancy Lonsdale, who
has served as pro tem on the SBC (appointed to a three-year term); Oakland
white collar criminal defense specialist
Eugene Brott (appointed to a six-year
term); and Los Angeles County Superior
Court Judge Madge Watai (appointed to a
three-year term). All new judges will
begin their terms on November 1 with the
exception of Watai, who will delay the
move until January 1 in order to ease the
transition for her successor on the Superior Court bench.
Los Angeles' Carlos Velarde was reappointed as a Hearing Department judge for
a four-year term. The Hearing Department's
sixth judge, David Wesley, does not come
up for reappointment until 1999.
Implementation of the Recommendations of the Discipline Evaluation
Committee. The Discipline Evaluation
Committee (DEC), created by the Bar to

evaluate the impacts of recent changes to
its discipline system, made a series of
recommendations in August 1994; the
Board of Governors' Discipline Committee has been considering these recommendations for the past 18 months. [15:2&3
CRLR 210; 15:1 CRLR 172-73; 14:4 CRLR
209]
- State Bar Court Staffing Changes.
Pursuant to suggestions from the DEC, the
Discipline Committee has been working
on a set of proposed organizational changes
to the State Bar Court and its staff. The
Committee hired court administration consultant Alexander B. Aikman to investigate possible formats for the changes; the
Committee also relied heavily on the recommendations of State Bar Court senior
executive Stuart Forsyth in producing the
proposal.
The proposal involves changes to sections 100-116 of the Bar's Transitional
Rules of Procedure (TRP), including the
controversial new rule 116, called "Administrative Functions." The rule effectively places State Bar Court staff under
the supervision of the State Bar, rather
than the SBC judges for whom they work.
[15:2&3 CRLR 210-11] At its June 22
meeting, the Committee decided to circulate the proposed revisions for public
comment. Following public comment, the
Committee made additional minor changes
at its September 27 meeting. In light of the
changes, the Committee sent the revised
proposal out for an additional 30-day public comment period.
Public comment was heavily critical of
portions of proposed new rule 116. California Judges Association (CJA) Executive Director Constance Dove commented
that proposed TRP 116 would be a direct
violation of the Code of Judicial Ethics
Canons 3B(9), 3C(l) and (2). Dove also
noted that, because the judges of the State
Bar Court are members of the CJA and are
subject to the Code of Judicial Ethics, they
might be subject to discipline for operating under the proposed rule. Presiding
State Bar Court Judge Lise Pearlman and
SBC judges Alan K. Goldhammer and
Ronald W. Stovitz all opposed vigorously
the proposed usurpation of judicial control
over the court's own staff. The judges
stressed that sufficient independence from
the State Bar is essential in the administration of justice, and would be severely impaired by the proposal.
CPIL's Professor Robert Fellmeth also
commented against the proposed changes.
As noted above, Fellmeth was the State
Bar Discipline Monitor from 1987 to 1992
and helped to draft the legislation creating
the State Bar Court. In his comment, Fellmeth stressed the legislature's intent to
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create an independent court, which is necessary because the Bar has retained control over the prosecutory component of the
discipline system through its appointment
and control of the Chief Trial Counsel. He
argued that the prosecutor should not
unduly influence the court, particularly
where -as here-the court's decisions
are entitled to "finality" (there is no assured
judicial review of SBC decisions). [11:1
CRLR 148] Fellmeth also noted that the
State Bar is controlled by a board consisting of 23 members, 17 of whom are elected
by the profession; he argued that the use
of a profession-dominated body exercising control over the staff and facilities of
the judges charged with disciplining that
profession undermines public confidence
in a fair and independent process.
Despite the disapproving nature of
most public comments received, the Discipline Committee recommended that the
Board of Governors adopt the proposed
rule changes at its October 27 meeting.
The Board of Governors followed the recommendation and adopted the proposed
changes. The final language included
some softening deference to the SBC
judges. However, the structure created ensures that the Board of Governors controls
the hiring, promotion, firing, compensation, and even job descriptions of all court
personnel. The rule requires the Bar to
adequately support the court's function,
not interfere directly with its independent
judicial decisionmaking, and consult the
judges in making major personnel decisions. However, critics argued that the obligation of the Bar to "consult" is windowdressing over the defacto control of facilities and personnel of the court, an outside
control which would not be countenanced
as constitutional or ethically proper in any
other court.
- Complainants' Grievance Panel
Changes.In 1987, the Complainants' Grievance Panel (CGP) was statutorily created in
order to review closed Bar discipline cases
in which no formal charges have been filed.
Since then, the CGP has conducted random audits of such cases and also reviewed matters referred by complainants
who were dissatisfied with the fact that no
charges were filed pursuant to their complaints. In 1994, the DEC recommended
that the CGP be abolished. At its April
1995 meeting, following a yearlong consideration of the matter, the Discipline
Committee approved a proposal to seek
amendments to Business and Professions
Code sections 6086.11, 6086.13(a)(11),
6093.5, and 6095(c). The proposal, presented to the Committee by State Bar Court
senior executive Stuart Forsyth, would replace the CGP with a Discipline Audit
2
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Panel (DAP). The DAP would serve a
similar purpose as the CGP, but would not
have the authority to review case closures
at the request of complainants. Those requests to review closures constituted most
of the workload of the CGP. [15:2&3 CRLR
211]
Following approval by the Board of
Governors at the April meeting, the proposed changes were amended into AB
1414 (Brown). The legislation was enacted and becomes effective as of January
I (see LEGISLATION). Panel members
have objected to the details of the new
law's implementation, complaining that
resources and authority have been denied
the new Discipline Audit Panel, and contending that it no longer serves as a meaningful outside check on the performance
of the State Bar's discipline system. Over
95% of the complaints to the Bar are disposed of privately; thus, this change may
remove or limit the major outside source
of independent review of these decisions
to close cases without investigation or discipline.
- Mandatory Remedial Education.
After a 90-day public comment period
ending on June 8, the Discipline Committee and the Board of Governors approved
amendments to State Bar Rule of Procedure 290. The new rule, effective August
26, implements the DEC's recommendation that disciplined attorneys be required
to attend the State Bar Ethics School or a
comparable remedial education course offered by a certified provider (if the attorney resides a substantial distance from the
school). Attorneys who have attended such
a course in the past two years, or are
excused by the Supreme Court, are exempt from the rule. [15:2&3 CRLR 211]
- Disbarment Extension in Lieu of
Permanent Disbarment. Early in 1995,
the Discipline Committee considered the
DEC's recommendation that certain attorneys be permanently disbarred with no
chance of reinstatement. At its February
22 meeting, the Committee decided the
suggestion was too harsh, and rejected a
proposed change to California Rule of
Court 951 (f) that would have enacted the
DEC's recommendation. As an alternative
to the DEC's recommendation, the Office
of Trial Counsel suggested an amendment
to Rule 662 of the Bar's Rules of Procedure. The proposal would require attorneys to wait ten years before being allowed to petition for reinstatement if they
have been convicted of felonies involving
moral turpitude, or convicted of misappropriation of client funds in an amount qualifying as grand theft. Currently, any disbarred attorney may petition for reinstatement after five years. The Committee re248

leased the proposal for a 90-day comment
period in April. [15:2&3 CRLR 211-12]
The Board of Governors was scheduled to discuss and approve the proposal
at its August meeting; however, then-Discipline Committee Chair James Towery
pulled the item off the agenda because of
last-minute objections from three of the
state's largest local bar organizations. Letters from local bars in San Francisco, Los
Angeles, and Orange County requested an
additional 90 days to consider the issue.
The requests stated that the Bar's original
request for public comment did not make
the terms and implications clear.
Towery's acquiescence to the local bar
associations prompted the strong dissent
of Wendy Borcherdt, a public member of
the Board. Ms. Borcherdt felt that the proposed rule had already been "watered down"
in an effort to appease opponents, and that
the local bar associations and other public
commentators had already been given an
excessive amount of time to respond to the
proposal. She noted that the public comment period began in April 1995, and had
been repeatedly publicized in the legal
press. Chair Towery scheduled reconsideration of the issue for the Committee's
December 1995 meeting, at which time
the Committee stayed action on the matter.
Observers expect no change in the current
arrangement which permits a petition for
reinstatement after "disbarment"-even for
the most egregious violators-after only
five years.
° Summary Disbarment of Attorneys.
The Chief Trial Counsel presented an
amendment to Business and Professions
Code section 6102 at the May 1995 meeting of the Discipline Committee. The proposal is a refinement of an earlier version
presented at the Committee's April meeting. The Committee approved draft legislative changes which would apply summary disbarment to attorneys convicted of
felonies involving moral turpitude. After
its approval by the Discipline Committee,
the proposal was referred to the Board Committee on Courts and Legislation for consideration in July 1995. [15:2&3 CRLR 212]
At the July meeting, that committee decided
to circulate the proposal for a public comment period ending on September 8.
At the Bar's annual meeting in September, the Board of Governors approved
the proposed bill to change Business and
Profession Code section 6102 as recommended by the Discipline Committee and
the Committee on Courts and Legislation.
This item is now on the Bar's legislative
agenda, meaning the Bar will attempt to
have the changes introduced in 1996.
Implementation of the Recommendations of the "Futures Commission."

During the spring of 1993, the Bar's Commission on the Future of the Legal Profession and the State Bar (the "Futures Commission") began a lengthy study of the
basic structure of the State Bar. Convened
by 1992 Bar President Harvey Saferstein,
the Commission was spawned by AB 687
(W. Brown), which would have abolished
the current "integrated" Bar and replaced
it with a more traditional occupational licensing agency within the Department of
Consumer Affairs. In response to Bar opposition, Speaker Brown later amended
his bill to create a 21-member task force
to study structural alternatives to attorney
regulation. Governor Wilson vetoed the
bill, objecting that its charter was not broad
enough and included no gubernatorial appointees. However, the State Bar regarded
the serious challenge as a "wake-up call"
and created the Commission, broadening
its scope as the Governor suggested, to
examine the need for legal services over
the next quarter century, the vision of
the Bar in meeting those needs, and the
proper framework to fulfill that vision.
[13:2&3 CRLR 219; 13:1 CRLR 140-41]
The Futures Commission issued its final
report and recommendations in April 1995.
[15:2&3 CRLR 209-10; 15:1 CRLR 175]
One key-and very divisive, as the
vote was 13-8-recommendation of the
Futures Commission is retention of the
"integrated" bar structure (the combination in a single entity of private trade association selected by the membership and
state regulatory agency exercising state
police powers). The Board of Governors
followed suit in August, voting to retain
the mandatory integrated structure. As noted
below, SB 60 (Kopp) was recently enacted,
and requires a plebiscite of California's
120,000 attorneys as to their thoughts on
the structure of the Bar (see LEGISLATION). Supporters of the plebiscite, such
as San Francisco chief deputy public defender (and Board of Governors member)
Peter Keane, contend that the State Bar is
a bloated, overly expensive bureaucracy.
He and other critics would like to see it
replaced with a smaller, less expensive
public agency (not controlled by the practicing profession) which reports directly
to the California Supreme Court, or which
is located under the Department of Consumer Affairs with other occupational licensing agencies, and whose duties are
limited to admissions, standard-setting, and
discipline. Any attorney would be free to
voluntarily join an attorneys' trade association.
Faced with this serious opposition, Bar
President Jim Towery is actively campaigning to retain the current structure. In
October, he urged lawyers to preserve
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"our rights of self-governance and independence." He contended that abolition of
the mandatory bar would eliminate lawyers'
ability to govern themselves, a trait unique
among professionals in California. He added
that such an action would result in no
coordination of legal assistance programs
for the poor, no ethics hotline, and no
voice to represent lawyers' interests in the
legislature. The plebiscite will be presented
to the attorneys in May 1996.
At the Board of Governors' July 7 meeting, the Coordinating Committee on Recommendations of the Futures Commission
announced that recommendations concerning over one-third of the conclusions reached by the Futures Commission either are
general position statements that require no
Board action or continue a specific policy
that is the status quo. Such recommendations of the Futures Commission were classified as "no referral necessary," meaning
that no further action be taken by the Board.
With regard to other Futures Commission recommendations, the following actions have been taken. Consideration of
the recommendation that only graduates
of ABA- or California-approved law
schools should be allowed to take the California Bar exam has been put over until
the February 1996 meeting of the Board
Committee on Admissions and Competence. At its December meeting, that committee decided that the question of reciprocity of admissions to persons licensed
three years or longer in another jurisdiction (if that jurisdiction reciprocates) requires additional study; a report will be
issued to the committee during its June
meeting. The recommendation calling for
mandatory professional liability insurance
for all active members has been referred
to the Discipline Committee. The Coordinating Committee recommended that no
further action be taken on the recommendation that adjudication of discipline cases
be transferred as under the aegis of the
Supreme Court.
Update on Bar Rulemaking. The following is a status update on proposed regulatory amendments which have been considered by the State Bar in recent months:
- Trial Publicity Rule. On September
14, the California Supreme Court rejected
the Bar's formulation of the trial publicity
rule required by SB 254 (Kopp) (Chapter
868, Statutes of 1994). As submitted by
the Bar, proposed Rule of Professional
Conduct 5-120 would have prohibited a
lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a
matter from, directly or indirectly, making
an out-of-court statement "that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication,"

if the lawyer knows or reasonably should
know the statement will present a "clear
and present danger" of influencing ajury's
verdict. The Bar's version rejects the standard in ABA Model Rule 3.6, which prohibits out-of-court statements which a
lawyer knows or should know will have a
"substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing" an adjudicative proceeding in the
matter. [15:2&3 CRLR 213-14]
The Supreme Court instead adopted
the "substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing" language of Model Rule 3.6.
The rule applies not only to jury trials but
also to any other "adjudicative proceeding," and took effect on October 1.
- Monetary Penalties for Attorneys
Disciplined. At this writing, the Discipline
Committee has yet to consider the comments received on its proposal to adopt
Guidelines for the Imposition of Monetary
Sanctions in Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings pursuant to Business and Professions Code 6086.13, which became effective on January 1, 1994. The Guidelines
would establish two ranges of fines for
disciplinary violations of the State Bar Act
and the Rules of Professional Conduct; an
upper range ($2,600-$5,000 per violation) applicable to the most serious statutory or rule violations, and a lower range
($100-$2,500 per violation) applicable to
all other statutory or rule violations. Under
the Guidelines, the specific sanction to be
imposed within the applicable range will
be determined by a State Bar Court judge
upon application of specified criteria.
Monetary sanctions will be paid into the
Bar's Client Security Fund, which assists
in compensating clients who have been
victimized by the intentional dishonesty
of their lawyers. [15:2&3 CRLR 214; 14:4
CRLR 213; 14:2&3 CRLR 224-25]
- Gifts to Attorneys from Clients. In
October 1994, the Bar forwarded its proposed amendments to Rule of Professional Conduct 4-400, regarding gifts to
attorneys from clients to the California
Supreme Court for approval. As amended,
the rule reads as follows: "[A State Bar]
member shall not: (A) induce a client to
make any gift, including a testamentary
gift, to the member or to a person whom
the member knows is related to the member; or (b) prepare an instrument which
provides for any gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, to the member or
to a person who the member knows is
related to the member, except where the
client is related to the member or transferee." The Court has yet to act on these
proposed amendments.
- Employment of Disbarred, Suspended, or Involuntary Inactive Attorneys. At its July meeting, after referral
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from the Discipline Committee, the Committee on Admissions and Competence
reviewed proposed new Rule of Professional Conduct 1-311 governing the duties
of attorneys who employ disbarred, suspended, or involuntary inactive attorneys.
Rule 1-311 arose from anecdotal cases of
suspended or disbarred attorneys continuing to work under the license of another
attorney, and engaging effectively in the
continued practice of law without licensure.
The proposed rule would require that
an attorney not employ, associate professionally with, or aid a person the attorney
knows or reasonably should know is a
disbarred, suspended, resigned, or involuntary active member to perform such
tasks that would constitute the practice of
law. In addition, prior to or when hiring
such a person, the attorney must notify the
Bar of the employment and describe the
duties to be performed.
The rule was recommended to the
Board of Governors, which adopted it and
transmitted it to the Supreme Court for
approval. At this writing, Rule 1-311
awaits consideration.
- Copies of Significant Documents
for Clients. In December 1994, the Bar
forwarded to the Supreme Court proposed
new Rule of Professional Conduct 3-520,
which would require attorneys to provide
to a client, upon request, with copies of
significant documents or correspondence
received or prepared by the attorney relating to the employment or representation.
[14:1 CRLR 176; 13:1 CRLR 142; 15:2&3
CRLR 214] At this writing, the Court has
not yet acted on the rule.
- Uncontested Admissions. A proposed amendment to California Rule of
Court 953(b) would give "finality" to unchallenged recommendations of the State
Bar Court in moral character proceedings
and in reinstatement matters. [15:2&3
CRLR 212] After a 90-day public comment period ending on July 6, the Board
of Governors approved the proposal at its
August meeting, upon recommendation of
the Admissions and Competence Committee. Before the rule goes into effect, it must
be approved by the California Supreme
Court.
- RulesforAccrediting Specialty Certifwation Programs. The Committee on
Admissions and Competence has proposed new Rule of Professional Conduct
1-400(D)(6), which would allow the State
Bar to certify specialty certification entities. Under the rule, an attorney would not
be allowed to advertise as a "certified specialist" unless the attorney is certified by
the California Board of Legal Specialization, or one of the entities certified by the
24
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Board. The proposal would also require
certified attorneys to state in their advertising the complete name of the entity
which granted certification. The deadline
for public comment on this proposal was
November 27; at this writing, the Admissions and Competence Committee plans
to readdress the matter in January, and
send it to the Board of Governors in March.
- Legal Services Trust Fund.The Board
Committee on Legal Services has proposed a rule that would allow organizations that receive legal service grants to
charge clients a "processing fee" fee of up
to $20; the current rule only allows $10.
On May 19, the committee released the
proposal for a 90-day public comment,
which ended on August 17. [15:2&3 CRLR
213] The committee has approved the revised rule, but approval from the Board of
Governors has been delayed. It is expected
that the Board will approve the proposal
at its January 1996 meeting.
Internetted. The Bar now has a presence on the WorldWide Web. The address
of the site is http://www.calbar.org. President James Towery announced the Bar's
undertaking at its September meeting.
Available information at the web site includes a listing of certified lawyer referral
services, State Bar continuing legal education programs, information about the
Bar's publications, and a complete alphabetical directory of resources.
*

LEGISLATION
SB 60 (Kopp), as amended July 28,
requires the Bar to conduct a plebiscite of
its active members in good standing to
determine whether they favor abolishing
the State Bar as the agency regulating
lawyers (see MAJOR PROJECTS). The
bill specifies the contents of the ballot for
the plebiscite, which includes an analysis
by the Legislative Analyst. The Board of
Governors is required to report the results
of the plebiscite to the Supreme Court,
Governor, and legislature by July 1, 1996.
This bill also requires the State Bar to
contract with the State Auditor to conduct
a comprehensive management audit of the
State Bar. This bill was signed by the
Governor on October 12 (Chapter 782,
Statutes of 1995).
AB 1414 (W. Brown), as amended
April 24, repeals existing provisions creating the Complainants' Grievance Panel
and instead provides for a Discipline
Audit Panel within the State Bar, consisting of three members of the State Bar and
four public members who have never been
members of the State Bar or admitted to
practice before any court in the United
States. The Panel will conduct specified
audits relating to the processing of comt50

plaints against attorneys by the State Bar
(see MAJOR PROJECTS). This bill was
signed by the Governor on July 6 (Chapter
88, Statutes of 1995).
AB 1435 (Brown), as amended June
20, establishes annual Bar membership
fees for the years 1996 and 1997 in the
same amounts as those for the year 1993.
This bill also continues the requirement
for 1996 and 1996 that Bar charge an
additional fee of $110 to be used exclusively for discipline augmentation.
Existing law authorizes the Board of
Governors to increase annual membership
fees by an additional amount not exceeding $10 to be used only for the costs of
financing and constructing a facility in
Los Angeles to house State Bar staff and
for major capital improvement projects
related to facilities owned by the Bar. This
bill deletes references to a State Bar facility in Los Angeles and instead provides
that the additional amount may be used
only for the costs of financing, constructing, purchasing, or leasing facilities to
house State Bar staff and for major capital
improvement projects related to facilities
owned by the Bar. The bill also requires
the State Bar, at least 30 days prior to
entering into an agreement for construction, purchase, or lease of a facility in San
Francisco, to submit its preliminary plan
and cost estimate for the facility to the
Judiciary Committees of the legislature
for review. This bill was signed by the
Governor on July 24 (Chapter 193, Statutes of 1995).
SB 682 (Peace). Existing law requires
the Medical Board of California, the State
Bar, and the Board of Chiropractic Examiners to each designate employees to investigate and report to the Department of
Insurance's Bureau of Fraudulent Claims
any possible fraudulent activities relating
to motor vehicle or disability insurance by
licensees of the boards or the Bar. As
introduced February 22, this bill requires,
in addition, that those entities investigate
and report any possible fraudulent activities relating to workers' compensation.
This bill was signed by the Governor on
July 22 (Chapter 167, Statutes of 1995).
SB 702 (Petris). Existing law regulating admission to the practice of law provides that, among other requirements, a
first-year law student attending a nonaccredited law school must pass an examination (the so-called "baby Bar") and shall
not receive credit for the first year of study
until he/she has passed the examination. A
student attending a nonaccredited law
school may not receive credit for any
study subsequent to the first year that is
done prior to passing the examination,
unless good cause exists for giving credit

for some or all of the study. The examination is given by the Committee of Bar
Examiners established by the Board of
Governors. As amended July 20, this bill
would have eliminated the requirement
that a student at a nonaccredited law
school pass the examination as a condition
of receiving credit for the first year of
study or subsequent study, and of admittance to the practice of law. The bill would
have instead required only that a student
at a nonaccredited school take the examination. The bill would have further required the Committee to notify a student
who has taken the "baby Bar" of what
his/her score suggests about the student's
probability of becoming an attorney; a
student may continue his/her legal studies
as long as he/she can satisfy the law
school's academic standards. In addition,
the bill would have required the State Bar
to publish the same statistics for the "baby
Bar" as it currently publishes for the general Bar examination.
For the second time in as many years,
Governor Wilson vetoed this bill on October
8. [14:4 CRLR 215] Among other things,
Wilson noted that, unlike the vast majority of
states which pernit only ABA-approved law
schools to confer law degrees, California has
three types of law schools: those that are
accredited by the ABA, those that are accredited by the State of California, and those that
are unaccredited. Students of accredited
schools are not required to take the "baby
Bar." According to Wilson, "[t]he requirement that the Baby Bar be administered reflects the lack of reasonable assurances that
the programs provided by unaccredited
schools comport with minimally acceptable
legal standards. Some programs clearly do.
Some do not."
AB 757 (Speier). Existing law provides for the award of exemplary (or "punitive") damages in an action for the breach
of an obligation not arising from contract,
where it is proven by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant has been guilty
of oppression, fraud, or malice. As introduced February 22, this bill would enact
the Fair Damages Distribution and Litigation Reduction Act of 1995, providing for
the apportionment of such exemplary damages which exceed twice the amount of
compensatory damages among the plaintiff, the State Bar, and a nonprofit corporation chosen by the plaintiff. Currently,
all such damages accrue to the plaintiff
(subject to fee apportionment to the plaintiff's attorney). [A. Jud]
AB 1420 (W. Brown). Existing law
requires an attorney who contracts to represent a client on a contingency fee basis
to provide a duplicate copy of the contract
to the client at the time the contract is
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entered into; the contract must be in writing and must include specified information. As introduced February 24, this bill
would require such a contract to include a
statement that before hiring a lawyer, the
client has the right to know about the
lawyer's education, training, and experience, and his/her actual experience dealing with similar cases. [A. Jud]
SB 596 (Petris). Existing law provides
that for a person to be admitted to practice
law, he/she must graduate from a law
school accredited by the examining committee of the State Bar or must otherwise
studied law, as specified. As introduced
February 21, this bill would prohibit the
State Bar from accrediting law schools,
and limit the activities of the State Bar to
responsibility for admission of persons to
the practice of law and discipline of members. [S. Jud]
SB 1183 (Mountjoy). Existing law imposes prescribed duties on every attorney,
including a duty not to encourage either
the commencement or the continuance of
an action or proceeding from any corrupt
motive of passion or interest. As amended
March 28, this bill would create a cause of
action against an attorney who violates
some of these duties, making the attorney
liable to the opposing party or parties injured for treble damages, as specified. [S.
Jud]
SB 1321 (Calderon), as amended June
29, would revise provisions relating to the
appointment of members of the Committee of Bar Examiners, delete obsolete provisions, revise provisions relating to undergraduate study or its equivalent, provide that an applicant can graduate from a
law school accredited either by the Committee or the American Bar Association,
revise provisions governing legal study or
apprenticeship, require passage of a professional responsibility examination as a
condition of admission to the Bar, revise
and add new provisions relating to applications and filing fees for the Bar examination, and revise and add new provisions
related to the admission of out-of-state or
foreign attorneys. [A. Jud]
AB 1241 (Richter), as amended September 6, and SB 141 (Beverly), as amended
August 1, are no longer specifically relevant to the State Bar.
*

LITIGATION
In Brosterhousv. State BarofCalifornia, 12 Cal. 4th 315 (Dec. 21, 1995), the
California Supreme Court affirmed the
Third District Court of Appeal's 1994
holding that the Bar may not restrict members who wish to challenge its calculation
of "chargeable" and "nonchargeable" expenses to binding arbitration.

The Brosterhouscase stems from Keller v. State Bar of California,496 U.S. 1
(1990) [10:2&3 CRLR 215-16], in which
the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the
Bar's use of mandatory membership fees
for ideological or political purposes unrelated to the "regulation of the legal profession or improving the quality of legal services." The Bar was compelled to create a
negative check-off enabling Bar members
to avoid paying that portion of their fees
dedicated to such unrelated use, particularly for legislative lobbying. The Third
District's decision in Brosterhous dealt a
blow to the Bar's attempt to limit the determination of required Bar fees to mandatory arbitration. The Bar had created a
mandatory arbitration procedure to adjudicate these disputes, and the Third District held that the Bar many not bind members in a manner which forecloses judicial
determination of first amendment rights.
[15:1 CRLR 179]
The Supreme Court agreed, and thus
affirmed the Third District's procedural
decision. Each year, the Bar calculates the
amount of each member's dues attributable to "nonchargeable" activities under
Keller. Members who object to use of their
dues for these activities are permitted to
subtract this amount from their dues payment. The plaintiffs in this action challenged the Bar's determination of the Keller amount and the dispute was submitted
to arbitration procedures adopted by the
Bar. The court held that precluding judicial review of such an arbitration decision
would violate congressional intent that a
"section 1983" (federal civil rights) cause
of action be available "even to persons
who have arbitrated a claim that mandatory dues payments are being used for
such purposes in violation of their First
Amendment rights to freedom of speech
and association." The court further held
that a section 1983 action may be brought
regardless of whether the member has
sought judicial review of the arbitrator's
decision.
In a related matter, County of Ventura
v. State Bar of California,35 Cal. App.
4th 1055 (June 14, 1995), the First District
Court of Appeal held that a public agency
which makes payment of the voluntary
portion of its employees' Bar dues has
standing to challenge the disputed amount.
The California Supreme Court denied the
Bar's petition for review of the First District's decision on September 14.
In Florida Bar v. Went For It Inc.,
U.S._ 115 S.Ct. 2371 (June 21, 1995),
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that states
may ban targeted mail solicitation by
plaintiffs' lawyers of accident or disaster
victims within 30 days of the incident.
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Writing for the 5-4 majority, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor reasoned that the state
has a legitimate interest in "protecting the
privacy and tranquility of personal injury
victims and their loved ones against intrusive, unsolicited contact by lawyers." As
such, the Court held that such rules do not
violate first and fourteenth amendment
rights.
Addressing the contention that the ban
interferes with free speech rights to contact potential clients in accident and disaster cases at the very time they are going
besieged by insurance companies and others armed with sophisticated legal representation, the Court noted that even though
commercial speech by lawyers and others
enjoys "a limited measure of protection,"
the constitutional right is not absolute.
States have a "compelling interest in the
practice ofprofessionals within their boundaries...as part of their power to protect the
public health, safety and other valid interests." Critics contend that the decision affirms a scheme allowing free reign to attorneys for prospective defendants or insurance
carriers to contact victims, make token payments, and foreclose informed redress. Although the 5-4 decision is considered narrow, it could open the door for more regulation of advertising.
In Hirsh v. Justices of the Supreme
Court of the State of California,67 F.3d
708 (Mar. 29, 1995), the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that attorneys
are not entitled to injunctive relief to halt
ongoing State Bar attorney disciplinary
proceedings conducted pursuant to a procedure which is itself constitutional. Appellant Hirsh and three other attorneys had
disciplinary charges pending against them
before the State Bar Court. Appellants
claimed, inter alia, that the process was
unconstitutional because of the State Bar
Court judge's denial of a recusal motion.
Appellants alleged that the judge had a
direct and substantial financial interest in
the outcome of the disciplinary hearing,
and his refusal to recuse himself rendered
the process unconstitutional.
Citing Younger v. Harris, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the decision of the trial
court to dismiss the case on grounds that
review is not warranted if the state judicial
process is ongoing, implicates important
state interests, and provides the plaintiff
an adequate opportunity to litigate federal
claims. The court held that all of the above
requirements were satisfied in this matter.
Although the rule provides for an exception where "extraordinary circumstances"
(such as bias) exist, the court concluded
that plaintiffs here did not overcome the
presumption of "honesty and integrity in
those serving adjudicators." In the instant
2!
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case, plaintiffs failed to offer any evidence
to support the allegation that the justices
or judges had direct and substantial interests in the outcome of the disciplinary
hearings.
The matter of In Re Ivan 0. B. Morse,
11 Cal. 4th 184 (Sept. 1, 1995), which first
came properly before the State Bar Court,
involved disciplinary action against attorney Morse. From early 1988 to late 1992,
Morse mailed out approximately four million advertisements offering to help in the
filing of homestead declarations. The advertisements were mailed to prospective
clients with the names of their mortgage
lenders displayed on the envelope, leading
many recipients to believe that the mailing
was from their mortgage lenders. In addition, the mailing implied that the recording of a homestead declaration would bar
a creditor from forcing the sale of a home.
However, California law provides for an
automatic homestead exemption even without the recording of such an instrument.
As a result of the mailings, Morse prepared homestead declarations for upwards
of 95,000 individuals. His net profit ranged
from $150,000 to $200,000 on gross receipts of $1.9 million. Morse continued to
send the mailings despite demands that he
cease and desist from the California Attorney General and the Alameda County District Attorney.
Morse suffered a subsequent civil judgment, including an injunction from further
violations and penalties of $800,000. In addition, the Bar commenced disciplinary actions against Morse. The State Bar Court
decided that the appropriate discipline in
Morse's case was a 60-day suspension.
Upon granting review, the California
Supreme Court disagreed with the State
Bar Court. It reasoned that Morse's protracted pattern of serious misconduct justified the imposition of a three-year suspension from the practice of law. Upon
full and timely payment of the $800,000
ordered by the superior court, the suspension would be reduced to two years. The
court noted that it was increasing the punishment in part because the respondent
persisted with his advertising campaign
even after he was ordered to stop.
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FUTURE MEETINGS

January 26-27 in Los Angeles.
March 1-2 in San Jose.
April 19-20 in Los Angeles.
May 31-June 1 in San Francisco.
July 19-20 in Los Angeles.
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